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Abstract  
This study proposes a foreign bank branch networks index (FBBNI) to capture bank-level 
exposure to competition from foreign banks in terms of geographical proximity. The index takes 
account of the rapidly expanding branch networks of both foreign and domestic banks in China. 
Based on data from a sample of three types of Chinese commercial banks from 2002 to 2011, we 
find that exposure to the branch networks of foreign banks is associated with improved 
profitability at domestic banks, higher efficiency, and increased non-interest income, consistent 
with knowledge transfer from foreign banks. These relationships are most pronounced for joint-
stock domestic banks (JCBs) presumably because their ownership structure fosters knowledge 
transfer. 
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1. Introduction 
 Rapid economic expansion in China has been accompanied by a series of reforms to the 
financial system, targeting the banking sector in particular. By the end of 2012, China had one of 
the largest banking sectors in the world in terms of total assets. Recent developments include the 
listing of major commercial banks on the stock market, liberalisation of interest rates, relaxation 
of geographic restrictions on city commercial banks, and the opening-up of the domestic market to 
foreign competition. In order to comply with its World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments, 
the Chinese government progressively removed regulatory obstacles after 2001, to allow foreign 
banks access to the banking market. Since the end of 2006, foreign banks have been allowed to 
engage in both local- and foreign-currency business with all categories of customers in all cities. 
By the end of 2012, there were 42 locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign banks and 412 
foreign bank branches in operation (CBRC, 2012). Due to these changes in government policy, 
China provides a clear case in which domestic banks which have operated in isolation from the 
rest of the world, within a few years, become directly exposed to the practices of foreign banks. 
The existence of this recent and clear-cut transition stage makes it easier for the effects of 
exposure to foreign banks to be measured. 
 
On the one hand, the entry of foreign banks increases competition, threatening the profits 
of domestic banks (Claessens et al. 2001). On the other hand, foreign banks can bring advanced 
technology, new products and expertise to the domestic market (Unite and Sullivan, 2003), and 
competition can stimulate improvements in efficiency at domestic banks (Berger et al. 2009; 
Manlagñit, 2011). Furthermore, the Chinese banking sector includes several categories of banking 
institution, each with a distinct ownership structure and operations in separate market segments 
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(Dong et al., 2013). The expansion of foreign banks could have a different impact on each 
category of domestic bank. This feature adds interest to the question of the impact of foreign 
banks in China. 
 
To measure the extent of domestic banks’ exposure to foreign banks, earlier studies mainly 
reply on aggregate measures, such as the assets of foreign banks as a percentage of total assets in 
the domestic banking sector (e.g. Claessens at al., 2001; Kim and Lee, 2004; Unite and Sullivan, 
2003; Shen et al., 2009). Such measures fail to reflect bank-specific exposure in terms of 
geographic proximity to foreign banks. Geographic proximity is important because it helps to 
facilitate knowledge diffusion, ease communication, and mobilise labour and technology transfer 
(Decressin and Fatas, 1995; Chuang, 2001; Adams, 2002; Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). It also 
determines the level of competition. Xu (2011) proposes a foreign exposure index to take account 
of geographic proximity, but the index does not properly reflect exposure via branch networks. 
The influence of foreign banks on domestic competitors could be significantly exerted through 
branch networks. To address this problem, we propose a foreign bank branch networks index 
(FBBNI), based on detailed branch location data of foreign and domestic banks. The influence of 
foreign banks on a given domestic bank is measured by the total number of foreign bank branches 
operating in cities in which the domestic bank has at least one bank. The potential for foreign 
influence via branches has become more important in recent years because of the rapid expansion 
of branch networks of city commercial banks (CCBs) and foreign banks in China. 
 
By using the new measure, we examine the impact of the penetration of foreign bank 
branch networks on the performance of Chinese commercial banks. To perform our analysis, we 
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construct a sample of 107 Chinese commercial banks over the period of 2002 to 2011. We regress 
the FBBNI on five performance measures, namely return on assets, non-interest income ratio, 
cost-to-income ratio, loan-loss reserves ratio, and a general performance index. We find that an 
increased presence of foreign banks helps to improve the performance of domestic banks in China, 
and the effect is stronger for state-owned and joint-stock banks than for city commercial banks.  
The effect is also stronger for domestic banks which receive foreign strategic investment, and 
stronger after the opening-up of the Chinese banking market in 2006. Our specific finding that 
domestic profitability is positively affected by foreign exposure differs from the findings of some 
previous studies, which use cruder aggregate measures of foreign bank penetration, and which 
report a negative association between profitability and exposure to foreign banks. The results 
remain consistent in robustness checks using two-step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the FBBNI is an improved 
measure of the exposure of domestic banks to foreign banks, and we therefore believe that our 
results regarding the impact of foreign banks are more accurate that those of previous studies. 
Second, the paper shows that the impact of foreign bank penetration depends on the type of 
domestic bank, where banks are distinguished by ownership and by the nature of their operations. 
Previous studies tend to ignore the fact that different types of banks may have different objectives 
and operate in separate market segments (e.g. Shen et al. 2009; Xu, 2011; Seo et al. 2013). Finally, 
the paper extends the limited studies of the Chinese banking sector by providing a picture of the 
expansion of foreign bank branches in China after its accession to the WTO, and during the recent 
global financial crisis.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
on the Chinese banking sector and the expansion of foreign banks. Section 3 reviews the literature 
on foreign bank entry. Section 4 describes our research method and data. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results, and the last section concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional background 
2.1. Ownership of Chinese banks 
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has gradually implemented a series of 
reforms in order to transform the country’s centralised policy-driven banking system into a 
decentralised, fully functional profit-oriented system. A gradual process of change has created a 
banking system with multiple categories of institutions and agencies, operating in separate 
markets with generally clearly delineated functions (Martin, 2012). Commercial banking 
operations in China are mainly conducted by three types of banks: five large state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), and city commercial banks 
(CCBs). The four largest SOCBs were established in the early 1980s and are directly owned and 
controlled by the state. They are often obliged to conduct projects which assist in fulfilling social-
welfare objectives, and to lend to favoured state-owned industrial enterprises (Fu and Heffernan, 
2009). JSCBs emerged in 1986 when the Bank of Communications was established, and they 
expanded rapidly throughout the 1990s.1 JSCBs have a different ownership structure from SOCBs. 
They have mixed ownership which includes the state, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private 
enterprises, and individual investors. Most of the controlling shareholders of JSCBs are market-
oriented SOEs which invest in JSCBs purely for financial returns (Jia, 2009). Therefore JSCBs are 
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less vulnerable to political intervention than SOCBs, and operate on a pure commercial basis 
focusing on profit maximisation. JSCBs are allowed to provide a wide range of products and 
services, and some of them have advantages in specific business areas. For example, Minsheng 
Bank is strong in trade-financing services; China Merchants Bank focuses on retail-banking 
services.  
 
In the mid-1990s, many large cities consolidated their urban cooperatives into CCBs, to 
promote local economic development. These banks were generally set up with a less concentrated 
ownership structure. The ownership is mainly distributed among local government agencies, 
SOEs, urban enterprises, and individuals. This plurality of shareholders may significantly reduce 
government intervention and result in better performance (Ferri, 2009). The scope of the CCBs’ 
business was initially restricted to the cities where they were founded. In 2005 the Bank of 
Shanghai made the first move to change this situation, by establishing a branch in Ningbo, after 
obtaining approval from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). Since then, many 
other CCBs have followed this move, establishing branches across provinces and cities. By the 
end of 2010, 78 CCBs had removed the word ‘City’ from their name to reflect their intention of 
going national. However, CCBs maintain much smaller branch networks than SOCBs and JSCBs. 
Most CCBs still have a strong local focus, and provide financial services to small and medium-
sized enterprises in their municipalities. Finally, in order to improve financial services in the 
countryside and boost rural development, a large number of rural commercial banks (RCBs) have 
been created since 2001. The structure of the Chinese banking system is summarised in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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2.2. The performance of foreign banks in China  
 The Chinese banking sector was first opened to foreign banks in 1979, but various entry 
barriers and restrictions on their business were imposed until 2006 (Ma, 2006). Since 1996, the 
Chinese authorities have encouraged foreign strategic investment in domestic banks.2 In 2003, the 
CBRC updated its guidelines regarding foreign equity investment. According to the revised 
guidelines, foreign investors are allowed to own up to 25% of a Chinese domestic bank, with an 
upper ceiling of 20% for any single investor. However, the potential benefits of foreign 
investment in domestic banks have been reduced by the short-term investment policy of some 
foreign bank investors.3  
 
 Since China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001, the Chinese government has 
progressively adopted the so-called open policy, to enhance the openness of the banking sector. 
Within five years of China’s accession to the WTO, most restrictions had been removed on 
foreign banks’ business operations and on the expansion of their branch networks. Since 2006, 
foreign and domestic banks have been treated in a similar manner, with a few exceptions.4 In 
general, they provide the same types of banking services, and face the same legal restrictions.5  
 
 The number of foreign bank branches has experienced rapid growth in recent years due to 
further opening-up of the Chinese banking sector. During 2004 to 2012, the number of foreign 
bank entities almost doubled (Figure 2).  By the end of 2012, 181 banks from 45 countries had set 
up 209 representative offices, and 37 banks from 14 countries had established incorporated 
entities, with 245 branches in China (CBRC, 2012). These 37 banks posted record profits in 2012, 
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reaching RMB 16.7 billion, while their total assets were also up by 24% year-on-year to RMB 2.2 
trillion. The rapid expansion of foreign bank branches increased competitive pressures on local 
banks. For example, between 2007 and 2011, 18 new foreign bank branches were established in 
Jiangsu Province, the home of many small and medium-sized businesses. These branches were set 
up throughout the province. According to the CBRC Jiangsu office, the loans made by foreign 
banks increased 383% between 2007 and 2011. All the foreign branches were profitable within 
one year after opening, and some were profitable within three months.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Many of the foreign banks chose to set up branches in first- and second-tier cities in the 
highly developed Eastern coastal region (Figure 3). For instance, of the 35 branches established 
by the Bank of East Asia China, 22 were located in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River 
Delta regions. China’s financial centre, Shanghai, accommodated 75 foreign branches by the end 
of 2012, accounting for 22% of the total. They jointly controlled 12% of Shanghai’s banking 
assets, much higher than the national average proportion of 2%. Of the 37 locally incorporated 
foreign banks, 21 have their head office in Shanghai, and several others have relocated their 
central treasury function to the city. Six other cities also have more than ten branches of foreign 
banks. Although the number of cities with foreign banks or branches has grown from 20 to 50 
within the past decade, the regional distribution of foreign banks remains highly uneven (Figure 3). 
This means that it is often inappropriate to use a national aggregate measure to proxy for the 
presence of foreign banks. For example, the performance of a Chinese CCB located in a western 
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city can hardly be influenced by a foreign branch located in a south-eastern city. Therefore, we 
propose a measure to account for the geographic proximity of foreign banks and their branches. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
3. Previous research 
According to Levine (1996), the benefits that can derive from allowing foreign bank entry 
include: stimulating the development of the supervisory framework of the domestic banking 
sector; enhancing the country’s access to a broader range of capital sources; and improving 
banking practices in areas such as service quality, products on offer, and the adoption of advanced 
technologies. In addition, since foreign banks tend to be less politically connected with the 
domestic regulatory authorities, their increased presence might inject additional competition 
(Terrel, 1986; Kroszner, 1998). In order to compete with international banks, domestic banks may 
‘cut prices’ to be more efficient, and fight fiercely to retain their previous market share 
(Bhattacharaya, 1993; Levine, 1996). Consequently, increased foreign entry forces local bankers 
to abandon their ‘quiet life’ and concentrate more on efficiency improvements (Berger and 
Hannan, 1998). On the other hand, to compete against foreign banks, local banks may need 
additional investments in updating their production technologies and techniques, building new 
branches, improving customer service, and recruiting talented human capital (Bhattacharaya, 1993; 
Xu, 2011). This would lead to an increase in costs and a decrease in profits in the short term, but 
to an improvement in overall performance of domestic banks in the long term (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2004; Shen et al., 2009) 
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Mixed empirical results have been documented in the literature. Clarke et al. (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2001) and Naaborg and Lensink (2008) find that an increased foreign presence 
leads to a reduction in profits, net interest margin and overall operating expenses for domestic 
banks in general. Unite and Sullivan (2003) and Manlagñit (2011) show that foreign banks serve 
as an effective competitive force which reduces the excess profit earned by Philippines banks and 
improves their efficiency. Barajas et al. (2000) likewise find that, in Columbia, increased 
liberalisation reduces intermediation spreads, but also lowers non-financial costs, instils additional 
competition, improves loan quality, and consequently strengthens the overall performance of the 
banking sector. 
 
Regarding China, Berger et al. (2009) find that minority foreign ownership improves both 
the profit and the cost efficiency of domestic banks significantly, in particular smaller banks. 
Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara (2008) find further that domestic banks can achieve the greatest 
efficiency gains when the foreign investor takes a minority stake and acts as a strategic investor. 
Similarly, Hasan and Xie (2012) find that foreign strategic investment improves the corporate 
governance of Chinese banks, which promotes overall performance. Firth et al (2014) find that 
after the introduction of a foreign investor, domestic banks tend to decrease their non-traditional 
business. Gao and Ge (2008) report that the majority of foreign banks in China are from 
developed nations, and that they exert a positive influence on the regulatory environment and 
consequently improve the efficiency of the banking sector. Xu (2011) and Seo et al. (2013) test 
the impact of foreign entry on the net profit margin, non-interest income and operating costs of 
Chinese banks. They conclude that the additional competition brought about by foreign banks has 
squeezed the interest margins of Chinese domestic banks, pushing them to cut operational 
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expenses and expand actively into non-traditional business areas, such as asset management and 
investment-consultancy services. However, Shen et al (2011) find that foreign bank penetration 
improves the profitability of Chinese banks, but does not reduce operating costs. 
 
 The above studies mainly rely on country-level aggregate measures such as the number of 
foreign bank branches operating in China, or the share foreign banks of total banking assets, 
which capture the overall foreign presence in the host country. To perform bank-level analysis, a 
better measure would capture the bank-specific exposure of individual domestic banks to foreign 
banks, based on geographic proximity. Chung (2001) and Gormley (2010) document the impact of 
geographic proximity in facilitating technology spillover and the transfer of lending practices 
from foreign to local banks. Xu (2011) argues that handily located foreign banks exercise more 
competitive pressure on incumbent banks than distant foreign banks. 
 
 Xu (2011) proposes a spatially disaggregated foreign exposure index based on the number 
of foreign banks in the city of the bank’s head office, in the case of CCBs, or in the city where the 
bank has a presence which has the largest number of foreign banks, in the case of other types of 
domestic bank. However, the index fails to reflect the impact of the rapidly expanding branch 
networks, and therefore does not take full account of the way in which foreign banks exert their 
influence on domestic banks. Xu’s index was more suitable when the operation of CCBs was 
restricted to within their geographical locations and when there was strict control of the number of 
foreign bank branches. 
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4. Research design 
4.1. Foreign bank branch networks index (FBBNI) 
 The mutual influence and competition between domestic and foreign banks in China have 
significantly increased over the last few years, as explained above. We argue that the influence of 
foreign banks can be transmitted to a domestic bank via their respective branch networks. Thus, 
this study uses the total number of foreign bank branches operating in the cities in which a 
domestic bank’s branches are also located, to determine the level of foreign bank influence on the 
domestic bank: 
 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚=1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚=1  (1) 
where Ni,t,m is the number of foreign bank branches in city m in year t in which domestic bank i 
has at least one branch. So Ni,t,m = 0 for a city in which bank i has no branches in year t. The 
denominator, ∑ =
j
m mti
N
1 ,,
max , is the maximum total number of foreign bank branches which a 
domestic bank faced in China over the sample period, i.e. the panel total maximum, which is 342.6 
FBBNI takes values over the interval [0, 1] and the higher the value is, the greater the influence of 
the foreign bank is on bank i in year t. 
 
 Table 1 presents three examples of the FBBNI calculation. Taking the Bank of Nanjing as 
an example, in 2011 it had branches in five cities; Nanjing, Shanghai, Wuxi, Hangzhou and 
Suzhou. There is a total of 104 foreign bank branches in these five cities, which can exercise their 
influence over the Bank of Nanjing’s branches. The ratio of 104 to 342 is used to measure the 
foreign exposure level that the Bank of Nanjing experienced in 2011. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Measures of bank performance and hypothesis development  
 Five proxies of bank performance are employed to investigate the links between foreign 
bank penetration and bank performance. These are return on assets (ROA), non-interest income 
ratio (NII), cost-to-income ratio (CI), loan-loss reserves ratio (LLR), and a performance index (PI) 
which is constructed by applying a principal components analysis to the four individual 
performance measures. In China the financial year-end is always 31 December, so the periods to 
which the accounting variables relate match the periods to which the measure of foreign exposure 
relates. 
 
4.2.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
 ROA is net income after tax divided by total assets, and it is the most frequently used 
measure to assess the profitability of banks. Foreign bank entry is usually expected to increase 
competition in the host countries, which in turn could weaken the ability of incumbent banks to 
sustain their profitability (Clarke et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2001; Unite and Sullivan, 2003). 
However, Lensink and Hermes (2004) argue that the impact of foreign bank entry on profitability 
also depends on the level of competition in the domestic banking sector. In the case of a less 
competitive banking market, an increase in foreign bank presence may not significantly and 
immediately increase competitive pressures on domestic banks. The benefits gained from foreign 
banks can outweigh increased costs due to greater competition. Therefore, the predicted effect of 
foreign bank penetration on banks’ profitability is ambiguous. In China the banking industry has 
remained semi-controlled by the government, and some studies confirm the existence of a 
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significant positive relationship between foreign presence and the profitability of domestic banks 
(e.g. Berger et al. 2009; Shen et al. 2009). On balance, we expect a positive relation between 
FBBNI and ROA.  
 
4.2.2 Non-interest income ratio (NII) 
 A second bank performance measure is the ratio of non-interest income to total assets. 
This captures a bank’s non-lending activities, including securities trading, fund management and 
credit cards. Levine (1996) and Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) suggest that foreign direct 
investment is likely to bring new products, processes and technology to the domestic market. 
Local banks will learn from their foreign competitors and engage more in fee-paying activities to 
increase their income. On the other hand, foreign banks generally possess a comparative 
advantage in non-traditional banking business. Consequently, this would squeeze the market share 
of domestic banks’ non-traditional banking business. Therefore, the predicted effect of foreign 
bank penetration on NII is ambiguous. However, on balance we expect a positive relation, because 
domestic banks have been compelled to develop new products and services to compete with 
foreign banks.  
 
4.2.3 Cost-to-income ratio (CI) 
 CI is defined as the ratio of operating expenses to operating income (interest and non-
interest income). This ratio is often considered to be the most popular non-frontier bank efficiency 
measure, in part because it reflects operations both on and off the balance sheet. Levine (1996) 
suggests that the spillover effect from foreign operations not only increases competition but also 
improves the efficiency of the domestic banking sector, by bringing better management skills, 
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advanced technology and new products to the domestic market. Foreign bank penetration is 
therefore expected to have a positive effect on the efficiency of domestic banks. 
 
4.2.4 Loan-loss reserve ratio (LLR) 
 LLR is the ratio of the loan-loss reserves to total earning assets. The loan-loss reserve is 
designed to provide for problem loans on which borrowers are likely to default. Thus, LLR is 
often used to measure the risk level of banks. Claessens at al. (2001) argue that an increase in 
foreign bank presence is likely to increase risks among domestic banks. With greater operational 
experience and higher quality customer services, foreign banks potentially are able to cherry-pick 
higher profile customers and leave the less creditworthy ones to the domestic banks (Grigorian 
and Manole, 2002). On the other hand, an increased influence of foreign banks, especially via 
higher foreign ownership, may generate some positive effects on the risk exposure of domestic 
banks, as they could learn more sophisticated risk-management techniques. 
 
4.2.5 Standardised performance index (SPI) 
 To assess the overall impact of foreign bank penetration, we apply principal components 
analysis to the above four performance measures, to construct an overall performance index for 
each bank. The first step is to determine how many factors should be used in our analysis. Only 
those factors with an eigenvalue of 1 or more are retained. Two factors are extracted for analysis, 
accounting for 67.5% of the total variance of the four financial ratios. For the first factor, F1, ROA 
has a positive factor loading while CI has a negative factor loading, as expected. F1 accounts for 
41.1% of the total variance. For the second factor, F2, NII has a positive loading, also as expected, 
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and LLR has a negative loading. F2 accounts for 26.4% of the total variance. The performance 
index is computed using the following formula: 
 PIi,t = (41.1%/67.5%)(F1 score)i,t + (26.4%/67.5)(F2 score)i,t (2) 
where the factor score for a given bank and factor is the sum of the products of the relevant bank-
specific variables and their corresponding factor loadings. The value of the index can be either 
positive or negative, making it difficult to interpret. Therefore, following Shih et al. (2007), we 
standardise the index using the following formula: 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (3) 
where minPIi,t (maxPIi,t) is the minimum (maximum) value of the index in the sample. The value 
of the standardised performance index (SPI) ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher value indicates better 
bank performance. We expect foreign bank penetration to have a positive effect on the overall 
performance of domestic banks. 
 
4.3 Empirical models  
 To examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on banking performance in China, we 
use the following regression model:  
  𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (4) 
where bank performance BPit represents various performance measures for domestic bank i in 
year t; FBBNIit is the key explanatory variable; Zit is a vector of control variables; YDt is a year 
dummy, capturing time-specific effects such as trends in regulatory reforms and technological 
advances; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the error term. In order to reduce a potential omitted-variables problem 
caused by assuming a linear relation between the dependent and independent variables, we allow 
for a non-linear relationship by adding a squared term for FBBNI into the benchmark 
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specification.7 We also calculate results, for comparison, using two aggregate measures of foreign 
bank penetration from previous research. The first, FBAt, is the total assets of foreign banks 
divided by the total assets of Chinese banks sector in year t. The second, FSIt, is the total number 
of banks with foreign strategic investment divided by the total number of Chinese banks. In line 
with the previous literature (e.g. Fu and Heffernan, 2009 Manlagñit, 2011; Xu, 2011), we also 
include several bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables in our models which might 
affect bank performance. The bank-specific variables are: capital adequacy (equity over total 
assets); total investment (non-interest-earning assets over total earning assets); operating expense 
(overheads over total earning assets); and LLR, except, of course, when LLR is the dependent 
variable. The two macroeconomic variables are real GDP growth and the rate of inflation, to 
control for the general economic environment in China over the sample period.  
 
 As discussed in Section 2, Chinese domestic commercial banks can be divided into four 
main types, namely SOCBs (Big Five), JSCBs, CCBs and RCBs. Each type has a distinct 
ownership structure, size, market segmentation and objective, and each is subject to a different set 
of regulations. Given these facts, the presence of foreign banks could have a different impact on 
the performance of each type of bank. We capture such differences by means of interaction terms 
of FBBNIi,t with dummy variables for bank type, namely JSCBit and CCBit (with RCBs included 
with CCBs).8 SOCBit is the omitted type. 
 
 During the five-year transitional period after joining the WTO, 2002-06, the Chinese 
government gradually removed all restrictions on foreign banks in terms region of operation, 
client base, and business scope. In 2007, China progressed into the ‘post-WTO transitional period’ 
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during which foreign banks could gain access to the Chinese banking market without restrictions 
on branch location or customers. Therefore, we expect the presence of foreign banks to have a 
greater impact on domestic banks during the latter post-WTO transitional period than the initial 
five-year transitional period, and we capture any difference in impact by means of an interaction 
term consisting times FBBNI times a dummy variable which takes the value of one for the years 
2007-11. 
 
 As an important part of the reform process, the Chinese government has encouraged 
foreign strategic investment (FSI) into many Chinese banks in the last ten years. The introduction 
of a foreign investor into those banks could have improved their competitiveness and corporate 
governance, and they may react differently to competition from foreign banks. We expect that 
foreign banks will have a greater impact on domestic banks with FSI than on domestic banks 
without FSI, and we test for this by including an interaction term consisting of FBBNI times a 
dummy variable for FSI. Finally, we also include an interaction term consisting of FBBNI times 
GFC, a dummy variable which takes the value of one for the years of global financial crisis, i.e. 
2008-2009, to explore the effect of the crisis on the progress of foreign banks.  
 
 Regarding estimation methods, we first apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the 
benchmark specification (equation 4), and we then use the two-step system dynamic Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) approach with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors to control for 
potential instances of endogeneity. For example, bank performance may affect the levels of bank-
specific variables such as capital adequacy and investment, and thus the latter may be 
endogenously determined in the model. Moreover, a bank’s current performance could influence 
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its future performance, so this could be another source of endogeneity. The consistency of the 
system GMM estimator depends both on the validity of the instruments used and on the 
assumption that the error term is not autocorrelated. The over-identifying restrictions can be tested 
by both the Sargan and Hansen J tests, which examine the overall validity of our instruments by 
analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions in the estimation process. We use 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test to examine whether the error term is serially correlated.  
 
4.4. Data and sample 
 Our sample is an unbalanced panel that comprises 107 Chinese commercial banks over the 
period from 2002 to 2011, with a total of 797 observations. The number of Chinese banks in the 
sample varies from a minimum of 36 banks in 2002 to a maximum of 107 banks in 2010. The 
sample comprises the five biggest SOCBs, twelve national and regional JSCBs, 83 CCBs, and 7 
RCBs. At the end of 2011, these 107 banks owned about 76% of the total assets of the Chinese 
banking sector. Thus, we believe that our sample offers a good representation of the overall 
banking market. All the bank-level data are drawn from BankScope – Fitch’s international bank 
database – and the annual financial reports of individual banks. The data on the location and 
numbers of both domestic and foreign bank branches used for measuring foreign bank penetration 
are gathered from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (ACFB), the CBRC’s database, 
and the annual reports and official websites of individual banks. The macroeconomic data are 
collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database. Table 2 presents a 
summary of the variable definitions and data sources. 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
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5.  Results 
 The regression results are reported in Tables 3 to 7. Regressions 1 and 2 in these tables 
examine the impact of foreign bank presence by using the traditional aggregate measures, FBA 
and FSI. Regressions 3 and 4 use our bank-specific measure, FBBNI. Regression 5 includes the 
squared term of FBBNI.9 In regression 6, FBBNI is interacted with dummy variables for bank type, 
JSCB and CCB. In regression 7, FBBNI is interacted with a dummy variable to capture whether 
the domestic bank has foreign strategic investment. Regressions 8 and 9 include the interaction 
terms FBBNI×OPEN and FBBNI×GFC to examine whether, respectively, the period of greater 
derestriction for foreign banks (2007-2011) and the global financial crisis (2008-2009) have an 
impact on the results. In each table, regressions 1 to 3 are estimated using OLS, while regressions 
4 to 9 are estimated using GMM. The results for the control variables are in line with expectations, 
and to save space, we only report the results for the control variables in Table 3.10 
 
5.1  Return on assets 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 Table 3 reports the results with ROA as the dependent variable, which is used as a proxy 
for profitability. Both the aggregate and disaggregate measures of foreign bank presence have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the profitability of domestic banks. These 
measures are also economically significant. For example, for a bank with the median level of ROA 
(0.0051), a one standard deviation increases in FBBNI (i.e. 0.267) leads to an increase in ROA of 
0.0016 unit, or 31%.11 The results suggest that high-quality management skills and/or modern 
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banking practices transferred from foreign banks enhance the profitability of Chinese banks. This 
finding is consistent with some previous studies of Chinese banks, including Shen et al. (2009) 
and Huang and Qin (2009), but it differs from the majority of studies of other countries, such as 
Claessens et al. (2001) and Unite and Sullivan (2003). They argue that in response to the 
increased competitive pressures induced by the presence of foreign banks, domestic banks are 
forced to reduce their profit margin to defend their market position. 
 
 In China, the opposite conclusion might result from the uniqueness of its financial market. 
As suggested by Lensink and Hermes (2004), the impact of foreign bank entry on profitability 
may depend on the level of competition of the domestic market. When the domestic market is less 
competitive, local banks are able to increase their prices in order to offset increased costs arising 
from foreign competition. Due to specific institutional arrangements and strict control over many 
years in China, the banking sector remains dominated by a few big SOCBs, and competition 
within the sector is moderate. Controlled interest rates remain a reality in China as the ceilings on 
deposit rates and the floor on lending rates have yet to be removed (Yao et al., 2012). Therefore, 
all these factors enable domestic banks to control market pricing to some extent, so as to maintain 
abnormal profits.12 
 
 In addition, the strength of impact could be influenced by the extent of foreign bank 
penetration. If the level of penetration is high, the benefits achieved by domestic banks in terms of 
efficiency gains could be offset by the additional competitive pressure that is brought about by the 
foreign banks. On the other hand, when foreign presence is limited, the improved performance of 
domestic banks can outweigh competitive pressure from foreign banks. This is the case for the 
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Chinese banking sector, where the degree of foreign bank penetration is increasing but is still at a 
fairly low level. 13  This potentially explains the positive relationship between foreign bank 
penetration and the return on assets of domestic banks.  
 
 When we include the squared term of FBBNI, its coefficient is not statistically significant 
and there are no significant differences in the results for the other explanatory variables. So there 
is no sign of a non-linear relation between ROA and FBBNI. The coefficient of the interaction 
term FBBNI×CCB is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, while FBBNI×JSCB is 
also negative but not significant. These results suggest that the profitability of the Big Five and 
JSCBs is affected more by foreign bank penetration than the profitability of the CCBs. The 
coefficient of the interaction term FBBNI×FSI is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that Chinese banks with FSI gain more from foreign bank penetration than banks 
without FSI, in terms of profitability. We also find that the effect of foreign banks on the 
profitability of domestic banks has significantly increased since the foreign banks were given 
easier to access to the Chinese banking market. This is indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the interaction term FBBNI×OPEN. Finally, the coefficient of the 
interaction term FBBNI×GFC is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
that the impact of foreign bank penetration on the profitability of domestic banks during the crisis 
period is weaker than the impact during the non-crisis period. These results are in line with 
expectations. 
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5.2   Non-interest income 
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
 Table 4 reports results using NII as the measure of bank performance. There is no 
statistically significant relationship between foreign bank penetration and domestic banks’ NII 
(regressions 1-3). Using GMM, the coefficient of FBBNI becomes positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level (regression 4). However, such a relationship only seems to exist 
among the JSCBs, as shown by the insignificance of the interaction term FBBNI×CCB and the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for FBBNI×JSBC. This latter result is also 
economically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in FBBNI (0.267) for a JSCB is 
associated with an increase in NII of 0.0157 units, which represent a 176% increase in relation to 
the median for JSCBs (0.0089). So it appears that foreign banks have most impact on product 
range and services of JSCBs.  
 
 The coefficient of the interaction term FBBNI×FSI is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level in regression 7. This result suggests that Chinese banks with FSI tend to react 
more actively to foreign banks’ presence than those banks without FSI, as we expected. Perhaps 
FSI implies that the learning process of banks is improved, enabling them to engage more in non-
traditional banking business and generate higher non-interest income. The coefficient of 
FBBNI×GFC is negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that although foreign bank 
penetration tends to increase non-interest income during ‘normal times’, the impact is weaker 
during the financial crisis.  
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5.3   Efficiency ratio 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 Table 5 presents the results with cost-to-income ratio, CI, as the dependent variable, which 
is used as a proxy for efficiency. A significant negative relationship is found between CI and the 
aggregate measures of foreign bank presence. However, this relationship is not so strong when the 
disaggregate measure FBBNI is used instead. The coefficients on FBBNI are only negative and 
marginally significant in regressions 4 and 7. The coefficient on FBBNI×OPEN is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that CI declines significantly in response to 
competitive pressures from foreign banks only during the post-transitional period, 2007-2011. The 
further opening-up of the domestic banking market allows greater foreign competition, which 
appears to lead to improved efficiency. Our findings on efficiency are in line with the bulk of 
previous research from China and from other countries, which reports that foreign entry is 
associated with improvements in efficiency (e.g. Berger et al, 2009, Unite and Sullivan, 2003, 
Manlagñit, 2011). 
 
5.4  Loan-loss reserve ratio 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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 Table 6 reports the results for LLR. The coefficients on FBBNI are negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better across all regressions. These results provide 
consistent evidence that foreign bank penetration encourages domestic banks to improve their risk 
management, resulting in better loan quality and lower risk exposure. The estimated coefficient of 
the interaction term FBBNI×FSI is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that risk 
reduction in response to foreign competition by banks with FSI is greater than by banks without 
FSI. Our findings with regard to LLR and ROA are not consistent with the results from some other 
countries that foreign banks are able to cherry-pick the best customers from domestic banks, 
causing the loan quality and profitability of domestic banks to fall. 
 
5.5  Standardised performance index 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 Table 7 presents the results for the standardised bank performance index, SPI, which is 
constructed by means of a principal components analysis. The results show that the coefficients 
for both the aggregate and disaggregate measures of foreign bank exposure are positive and 
significant at the 10% level or better across all models. This finding suggests that foreign bank 
penetration improves the overall performance of Chinese banks. The coefficient of the interaction 
term FBBNI×JSCB is positive and significant at the 10% level, while FBBNI×CCB is negative but 
not significant. This suggests that the overall performance of the Big Five and JSCBs is affected 
more by foreign bank penetration than the performance of CCBs. A possible reason is that the 
former two types of bank have a more extensive branch network than the CCBs, and so they 
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potentially receive more influence from foreign banks. In addition, competition is more intense 
between foreign banks and the Big Five and JSCBs, than between foreign banks and CCBs, 
because the target customers and the services they provide are more similar in the former cases. 
 
 The interaction term FBBNI×FSI is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating 
that banks with FSI benefit more from the presence of foreign banks than banks without FSI. 
Finally, we find that the influence of foreign banks on the overall performance of domestic banks 
significantly increased during 2007-2011. Overall, the results for the four performance measures 
and for SPI, using the improved FBBNI measure of foreign entry, provide robust evidence that the 
penetration of foreign banks into China has led both to improved profitability and, to some extent, 
improved efficiency on the part of domestic banks. 
 
5.6 Further checks for nonlinearity 
 There is no particular reason to expect a linear relation between aspects of the performance 
of domestic banks and the level exposure of the latter to foreign banks. Although FBBNI2 is 
included in some of the above regression specifications, it is possible that potential nonlinearity is 
not captured adequately by including this squared term. To check further for nonlinearity, we 
carry out two tests. First, we run regression specification error tests (RESETs) on the OLS 
regressions reported above (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 308). Second, we replace FBBNIi,t in regression 
4 in Tables 3 to 7 by dummy variables reflecting the ranking of exposure to foreign banks of bank 
i in year t. The values of FBBNIi,t are ranked and split into quartiles, Q1 with the lowest values 
and Q4 with the highest. Three dummy variables are included in the regression; for example 
Q2FBBNIi.t takes the value one if FBBNIi.t is in the second quartile, and zero otherwise. 
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Q1FBBNIi.t is the omitted quartile. Inspection of the coefficients on the three dummy variables 
gives a direct impression of the extent to which the relation between the dependent variable and 
FBBNIi.t is linear. 
 None of the RESET tests provides evidence of nonlinearity, and most of the results 
(unreported) for the dummy variables indicate an approximately linear relation. The coefficients 
increase monotonically and without major jumps when ROA, NII, LLR or SPI is the dependent 
variable. The only exception is when CI is the dependent variable. The coefficient is –0.059 on 
Q2FBBNIi.t  and –0.139 on Q3FBBNIi.t, indicating that increased exposure to foreign banks is 
associated with a smaller cost-to-income ratio, as expected. However, the coefficient on 
Q4FBBNIi.t is –0.112, less negative than that on Q3FBBNIi.t, indicating nonlinearity in the upper 
half of exposure to foreign banks. We find no other evidence of nonlinearity. So we are 
reasonably confident that the regressions in Tables 3 to 7 are not seriously mis-specified with 
respect to linearity. 
6. Conclusion  
 Since the end of 2006, when China further opened its domestic financial market to foreign 
competition, many foreign banks have rushed into the market, competing for a vast customer base 
and potentially lucrative business opportunities. This paper explores the impact on domestic banks 
of exposure to foreign banks. The exposure of each domestic bank is measured by the total 
number of foreign bank branches operating in the cities in which the domestic bank’s branches are 
also located, scaled by the maximum possible exposure during the sample period. The resulting 
new foreign bank branch network index is sensitive to geographic proximity, which matters given 
recent developments in Chinese commercial banking, such as further relaxation of geographic 
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restrictions for city commercial banks. Both OLS and GMM are used to test the impact of 
exposure on: the return on assets of domestic banks; their non-traditional activities, measured by 
non-interest income ratio; operational efficiency, measured by the cost-to-income ratio; their 
management of risk, measured by the loan-loss reserves ratio; and their overall performance, 
measured by a performance index derived from a principal components analysis.  
 
 We find that, using both both aggregate and disaggregate measures, exposure to foreign 
banks has a significant positive relationship with the profitability of domestic banks. A possible 
explanation is that high-quality management skills and/or modern banking practices have been 
learned from foreign banks, and have enhanced the profitability of the Chinese banking sector. 
The positive impact on domestic profitability is contrary to the findings of some previous studies, 
but it could be explained by circumstances specific to China. After all the reforms, the Big Five 
state-owned banks were left dominating the financial system, and some controls on the banking 
sector are still in place. These circumstances reduce the negative impact of foreign bank 
competition on the profitability of domestic banks. In addition, despite expanding rapidly in recent 
years, the penetration level of foreign banks remains limited in China. Therefore, our 
interpretation is that the efficiency gains obtained by domestic banks which learn from foreign 
counterparts have yet to be fully offset by additional competitive pressure. We find, in addition, 
that the profitability of the Big Five and JSCBs has benefited more from foreign bank penetration 
than that of the CCBs. 
 
 Regarding non-interest income, only use of our new FBBNI measure reveals a significant 
positive relationship between foreign bank penetration and domestic banks’ NII. Foreign entry 
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appears to stimulate local banks to engage in some non-traditional business activities. However, 
we find that such a response occurs only among the JSCBs. Regarding efficiency, we do not find a 
significant relationship between the cost-to-income ratio and FBBNI for the full sample period. 
Nevertheless, we do find that exposure to foreign banks is associated with greater efficiency at 
domestic banks during the period of greater liberalisation for for banks, 2007-2011. We also 
report evidence that foreign bank penetration could help domestic banks to improve their 
management of risk, in particular among those banks with foreign strategic investment. Finally, 
based on the results of our performance index, we find that exposure to foreign banks has a 
significantly positive impact on the overall performance of domestic banks. The impact of 
exposure has been most beneficial among banks with foreign strategic investors, and joint-stock 
commercial banks. Our evidence supports the view that, to enable the Chinese banking sector to 
continue to improve its efficiency, the Chinese government should further encourage foreign 
banks to expand their operations by opening more branches, and should allow foreign banks to 
acquire larger stakes in Chinese banks.   
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Tables and figures: 
Figure 1: Overall structure of the Chinese banking system 
 
Source: CBRC 2012 annual report  
 
Figure 2: Foreign Banking Operations in China (2004-2012) 
  
Source: CBRC 2012 annual report; Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003-2004). 
* Include the headquarters, branches and subsidiaries of locally incorporated foreign banks and foreign bank branches. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of foreign banks in mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan), 2011 
  
Table 1 Three examples of the calculation of FBBNI 
Bank name 
Domestic bank 
branch locations 
Exposure to foreign 
bank branches  
Panel total 
maximum  FBBNI 
Bank of Nanjing (CCB) in 2011 Nanjing 5 
  
 
Shanghai 75 
  
 
Wuxi 4 
  
 
Hangzhou 9 
  
 
Suzhou 11 
  
 
Total  104 342 =104/342=0.3041 
China Minsheng Bank (JSCB) in 
2009 
Beijing  41 
  
 
Shanghai 75 
  
 
… … 
  
 
Xi’an 2 
  
 
Kunming 1 
  
 
Total  275 342 =275/342=0.8041 
Bank of China (SOCB) in 2006 Beijing 27 
  
 
Shanghai 57 
  
 
… … 
  
 
Chongqing  5 
  
 
Kunming 1 
  
 
Total  197 342 =197/342=0.5760 
Note: CCB = city commercial bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial bank.  
Table 2 Description of variables and data sources 
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Variable Definition Data source 
Dependent variables     
Return on asset (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets  Bankscope; Banks’ annual reports 
Non-interest income (NII) Ratio of non-interest income over total assets Same as above 
Efficiency ratio (CI) Ratio of operating expenses to operating income Same as above 
Risk (LLR) Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans Same as above 
Standardised performance 
index  Constructed by using a principal components analysis   Authors’ calculation  
L1, L2 Lag of one year, lag of two years  Bankscope; Banks’ annual reports 
Independent variable    
Foreign presence  
  Foreign bank assets 
(FBA %) 
Share of total assets of foreign banks in total Chinese banking 
assets  CBRC and ACFB 
Foreign strategic investors 
(FSI) 
The number of banks with FSI over total number of  domestic 
commercial banks Same as above 
Foreign bank branch 
network index (FBBNI) 
The total number of foreign bank branches in all cities in 
which domestic banks have branches over the panel total 
maximum 
ACFB and Banks’ 
annual reports  
Bank-specific variables      
Equity level (E/TA) Ratio of the book value of shareholders’ equity to total assets  Bankscope; Banks’ annual reports 
Total investment (TI/TA) Ratio of total investment to total assets  Same as above 
Loan loss reserve ratio  Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans Same as above 
Operating expense (OE) Ratio of total overhead expenses to total assets Same as above 
Big Five state-owned 
banks (SOCBs) (Omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is one of the five 
biggest state-owned commercial banks and 0 otherwise  CBRC 
Joint stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is a joint stock 
commercial bank and 0 otherwise Same as above 
City and rural commercial 
banks (CCBs ) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is a city or rural 
commercial bank and 0 otherwise Same as above 
Dummy for foreign 
strategic investment 
(DFSI) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has foreign strategic 
investment  and 0 otherwise Banks’ annual reports 
Economic factors  
  
Economic growth 
(GDP %) Annual growth rate of GDP World Bank 
Inflation rate (INFL %) Percentage change in the consumer price index Same as above 
Post-transitional period of 
WTO entry (Open) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the post-transitional period 
of WTO entry and 0 otherwise 
CBRC 
Global financial crisis 
(GFS)  
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Global financial crisis period 
and 0 otherwise 
Same as above 
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Table 3 Effects of foreign bank penetration on Chinese banks’ return on assets (ROA)  
Dependent 
variable: 
ROA 
OLS GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L1.ROA    0.141* (0.076) 
0.083 
(0.133) 
0.150* 
(0.818) 
0.1259 
(0.135) 
0.113 
(0.140) 
0.532*** 
(0.120) 
L2.ROA    -0.023 (0.075) 
-0.057 
(0.081) 
-0.078 
(0.085) 
0.002 
(0.080) 
-0.009 
(-0.075) 
0.107 
(0.655) 
E/TA 0.067*** (0.008) 
0.064*** 
(0.008) 
0.079*** 
(0.001) 
0.173*** 
(0.030) 
0.150** 
(0.067) 
0.154** 
(0.059) 
0.158*** 
(0.057) 
0.148** 
(0.075) 
0.150*** 
(0.051) 
TI/TA -0.001 (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
OE -0.047 (0.055) 
-0.028 
(0.058) 
-0.096 
(0.060) 
0.211 
(0.272) 
0.200 
(0.223) 
0.673 
(0.429) 
0.425 
(0.337) 
0.442 
(0.343)     
0.445 
(0.325) 
LLR 0.031*** (0.010) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.016) 
0.069 
(0.125) 
0.027 
(0.168) 
- 0.056 
(0.110) 
0.062 
(0.134) 
0.091  
(0.166) 
0.114 
(0.116) 
GDP -0.073*** (0.010) 
-0.084*** 
(0.011) 
-0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
- 0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.062 
(0.134) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
INFL -0.006 (0.009) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.113) 
0.0124 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.035) 
0.011    
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
FBA 0.264*** (0.027)         
FSI  0.027*** (0.004)        
FBBNI   0.004*** (0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.005*  
0.003   
0.008** 
(0.003) 
FBBNI2     0.010 (0.014)     
JSCB      0.016 (0.030)    
CCB      0.040 (0.024)    
FBBNI 
*JSCB      
-0.020 
(0.045)    
FBBNI  
*CCB      
-0.008* 
(0.005)    
DFSI       -0.006 (0.005)   
FBBNI 
*DFSI       
0.010** 
(0.005)   
OPEN        0.002   (0.003)  
FBBNI 
*OPEN        
0.009**   
(0.004)  
GFC         -0.017** (0.007) 
FBBNI*GFC         -0.003** (0.001) 
Constant 0.007*** (0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.048) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.043* 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.089                
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Time dummy No  No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
No. of 
observations  797 797 797 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R2 0.308 0.303   0.252       
AR(1)/AR(2)     0.003/0.528 0.007/0.802 0.028/0.533 0.015/0.453 0.007/0.529 0.002/0.852 
Sargan 
/Hansen     0.196/0.191 0.395/0.111 0.597/0.191 0.236/0.099 0.065/0.129 0.356/0.333 
Notes: A detailed definition of variables can be found in Table 2. To save space, results for the control variables are 
omitted in Table 2 and the remaining tables. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Sargan and 
Hansen are the p value of the Sargan and Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions. AR(1)/AR(2) reports 
the p value of the first- and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. *, ** and *** represent that the estimation is 
significant at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
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      Table 4 Effects of foreign bank penetration on Chinese banks’ non-interest income (NII)  
Dependent 
variable: NII OLS GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L1.NII    0.694*** (0.150) 
0.630*** 
(0.15) 
0.586** 
(0.175) 
-0.834 
(0. 615) 
-1.650*** 
(0. 420) 
-1.322*** 
(0.448) 
L2.NII    0.016 (0.100) 
-0.003 
(0.091) 
-0.005 
(0.110) 
0.469 
(0.602) 
0.368 
(0.070) 
0.392 
(0.405) 
FBA 0.033 (0.046)         
FSI  
0.003 
(0.003)        
FBBNI   
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.009*   
(0.005)    
0.007* 
(0.004) 
FBBNI2     
-0.017 
(0.018)     
JSCB      
-0.013 
(0.023)    
CCB      
-0.012 
(0.026)    
FBBNI 
*JSCB      
0.059** 
(0.027)    
FBBNI 
*CCB      
0.009 
(0.031)    
DFSI       
0.084 
(0. 070)   
FBBNI 
*DFSI       
0.051** 
(0. 025)   
OPEN        
0.005**   
(0.019)  
FBBNI 
*OPEN        
0.002    
(0.008)  
GFC         
-0.001 
(0.001) 
FBBNI*GFC         
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
Constant 0.002* (0.012) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.005)  
0.019 
(0.030) 
0.025 
(0.017) 
0.012                  
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0. 011) 
Time dummy No  No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
No. of 
observations  797 797 797 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R2 0.066 0.065 0.252       
AR(1)/AR(2)     0.001/0.958 0.004/0.915 0.003/0.910 0.123/0.529 0.006/0.854 0.009/0.474 
Sargan 
/Hansen     0.334/0.624 0.458/0.819 0.178/0.544 0.049/0.442 0.139/0.239 0.236/0.099 
Notes: A detailed definition of variables can be found in Table 2. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Sargan and Hansen are the p value of the Sargan and Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions. 
AR(1)/AR(2) reports the p value of the first- and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. *, ** and *** represent 
that the estimation is significant at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Effects of foreign bank penetration on Chinese banks’ cost-to-income ratio (CI)  
Dependent 
variable: CI OLS GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L1.ER    0.352** (0.002) 
0.367** 
(0.156) 
0.160** 
(0.276) 
0.415** 
(0.189) 
0.456*** 
(0.123) 
0.571*** 
(0.128) 
L2.ER    -0.105* (0.054) 
-0.105 
(0.053) 
-0.106* 
(0.057) 
-0.070 
(0.081) 
-0.035 
(0.084) 
-0.025 
(0.064) 
FBA -8.259*** (1.196)         
FSI  -0.558*** (0.075)        
FBBNI   -0.096 (0.060) 
-0.231* 
(0.134) 
-0.435* 
(0.267) 
-0.530 
(0.764) 
-0.268* 
(0.157) 
-0.1244   
(0.1225)    
-0.107* 
(0.060) 
FBBNI2     -0.159 (0.339)     
JSCB      0.444 (1.455)    
CCB      0.115 (0.770)    
FBBNI 
*JSCB      
-0.517 
(0.591)    
FBBNI 
*CCB      
0.196 
(0.997)    
DFSI       0.029 (0.087)   
FBBNI 
*DFSI       
0.104 
(0.268)   
OPEN        -0.024  (0.035)  
FBBNI 
*OPEN        
-0.282**   
(0.121)  
GFC         -0.008 (0.012) 
FBBNI*GFC         0.009 (0.048) 
Constant 0.735*** (0.035) 
0.6385*** 
(0.032) 
0.608*** 
(0.003) 
-0.031 
(0.172) 
0.180 
(0.154) 
-0.143 
(0.770) 
-0.042 
(0.198) 
0.274                   
(0.175) 
0.047 
(0.153) 
Time dummy No  No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
No. of 
observations  797 797 797 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R2 0.288 0.295 0.251       
AR(1)/AR(2)     0.014/0.570 0.014/0.630 0.585/0.932 0.038/0.571 0.001/0.536 0.000/0.522 
Sargan 
/Hansen     0.428/0.684 0.378/0.652 0.702/0.690 0.435/0.690 0.203/0.105 0.425/0.645 
Notes: A detailed definition of variables can be found in Table 2. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Sargan and Hansen are the p value of the Sargan and Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions. 
AR(1)/AR(2) reports the p value of the first- and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. *, ** and *** represent 
that the estimation is significant at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Effects of foreign bank penetration on Chinese banks’ loan-loss reserves (LLR)  
Dependent 
variable: LLR OLS GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L1.LLR    0.346** (0.180) 
0.343* 
(0.204) 
0.270 
(0.307) 
0.367* 
(0.192) 
0.306** 
(0.139) 
0.287** 
(0.122) 
L2.LLR    0.723 (0.044) 
0.070 
(0.048) 
0.0241 
(0.090) 
0.046 
(0.046) 
0.077* 
(0.040) 
0.071* 
(0.037) 
FBA 0.409* (0.235)         
FSI  -0.092 (0.059)        
FBBNI   -0.008* (0.005) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.043* 
(0.026) 
-0.034** 
(0.017) 
-0.065** 
(0.029) 
-0.053**   
(0.242)    
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
FBBNI2     0.041 (0.026)     
JSCB      -0.115 (0.098)    
CCB      0.047 (0.059)    
FBBNI 
*JSCB      
-0.011 
(0.011)    
FBBNI 
*CCB      
0.036 
(0.067)    
DFSI       0.002 (0.009)   
FBBNI 
*DFSI       
-0.008** 
(0.004)   
OPEN        -0.004 (0.005)  
FBBNI 
*OPEN        
0.009   
(0.010)  
GFC         0.001 (0.001) 
FBBNI*GFC         -0.004 (0.003) 
Constant 0.031*** (0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
0.105 
(0.078) 
0.033** 
(0.014) 
-0.012                   
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
Time dummy No  No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
No. of 
observations  797 797 797 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R2 0.0481 0.0493 0.0429       
AR(1)/AR(2)     0.246/0.151 0.233/0.199 0.464/0.414 0.227/0.290 0.216/0.137 0.227/0.111 
Sargan 
/Hansen     0.106/0.180 0.069/0.092 0.124/0.158 0.307/0.458 0.114/0.163 0.163/0.193 
Notes: A detailed definition of variables can be found in Table 2. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Sargan and Hansen are the p value of the Sargan and Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions. 
AR(1)/AR(2) reports the p value of the first- and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. *, ** and *** represent 
that the estimation is significant at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7 Effects of foreign bank penetration on Chinese banks’ overall performance   
Dependent 
variable: SPI OLS GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.SPI    0.507* (0.283) 
0.420** 
(0.187) 
0.190 
(0.276) 
0.417*** 
(0.155) 
0.364*** 
(0.130) 
0.476*** 
(0.141) 
L2.SPI    -0.189 (0.160) 
-0.098* 
(0.053) 
-0.114 
(0.044) 
-0.130** 
(0.057) 
-0.100** 
(0.047) 
-0.106* 
(0.058) 
FSI  0.873*** (0.115)        
FBBNI   0.045*** (0.016) 
0.168*** 
(0.047) 
0.170*** 
(0.066) 
0.201** 
(0.094) 
0.307* 
(0.163) 
0.403** 
(0.159) 
0.181** 
(0.087) 
FBBNI2     0.294 (0.742)     
JSCB      0.489 (0.725)    
CCB      0.830 (0.608)    
FBBNI*JSCB      1.230* (0.736)    
FBBNI *CCB      -1.209 (0.814)    
DFSI       0.073 (0.079)   
FBBNI*DFSI       0.250* (0.144)   
OPEN        0.059* (0.035)  
FBBNI*OPEN        0.118* (0.633)  
GFC         -0.009 (0.019) 
FBBNI*GFC         -0.017 (0.052) 
Constant 0.366*** (0.053) 
0.549*** 
(0.049) 
0.565*** 
(0.054) 
0.217 
(0.150) 
0.604 
(0.241) 
-0.135 
(0.647) 
0.691*** 
(0.250) 
0.500*** 
(0.148) 
0.711*** 
(0.174) 
Time dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
No. of 
observations  797 797 797 582 582 582 582 582 582 
R2 0.288 0.293 0.248       
AR(1)/AR(2)     0.036/0.956 0.09/0.489 0.05/0.555 0.169/0.563 0.020/0.928 0.033/0.933 
Sargan 
/Hansen     0.078/0.241 0.208/0.951 0.120/0.437 0.681/0.297 0.521/0.645 0.057/0.193 
Notes: Detailed definition of variables can be found in Table 2. Sargan and Hansen are the p value of the Sargan and 
Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions.  AR(1)/AR(2) reports the p value of the first and second-order 
autocorrelation test statistic. *, ** and *** denote that an estimate is significantly different from zero at the10%, 5% 
or 1% level, respectively.    
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1 In 2006, the ‘Big Five’ were officially relabelled as ‘large-scale commercial banks’ from ‘wholly state-owned 
commercial banks’ to reflect the result of ownership diversification. BOCOM is much larger than the JSCBs, and its 
shares are spread among different state-owned entities. Therefore, in 2006, the CBRC redefined it as a SOCB and it 
joined the other four big state-owned banks (the Big Four) to become the Big Five. For consistency, we treat BOCOM 
as a SOCB rather than a JSCB throughout the period. 
2 The Asian Development Bank was the first foreign financial institution to purchase an interest in a Chinese domestic 
bank when in 1996 it purchased a 3.3% stake in the China Everbright Bank for $1.9m (Berger et al., 2009).    
3 For example, on 17 June 2005, the Bank of America (BOA) invested $3.0 billion in a 9% stake of the China 
Construction Bank and in August 2011, BOA sold half of its China Construction Bank holding for $8.3 billion, 
making an after-tax profit of about $3.3 billion in five years (Protess, 2011). 
4 For instance, foreign banks are still not allowed to offer automobile financing. 
5 At the end of 2006, the CBRC imposed a prudent supervision measure on foreign banks. It requires that foreign 
banks must be locally incorporated as legal entities before they offer a full range of banking services to Chinese 
citizens.   
6 The cross-sectional maximums per year are not the preferred benchmark since they vary over time. In order to 
reflect changes in the number of foreign bank branches at the city level over time, we use the panel total maximum as 
a constant benchmark.  
7 We thank a reviewer for raising this point. 
8 Due to their relatively small size and shorter history, this study only includes seven major RCBs. During the past 
few years, the RCBs have gradually shifted away from a policy-driven, rural-oriented business model to a market-
oriented urban-focused operational model, and they have also started to compete directly with other commercial 
banks, especially the CCBs. Therefore, we classify the RCBs within the CCB category. 
9 In order to minimise the potential omitted-variables problem, we also include the squared terms of the control 
variables in the models. There is little evidence of non-linear effects, and so these results are not tabulated.  
10 Ferri (2009) argues that CCBs have a strong local focus and that their performance is related to the banks’ locations. 
Therefore, as a robustness check, we re-estimate the main regressions by controlling for the levels of regional 
economic development in the sub-samples of CCBs. We include the real GDP growth of the province in which the 
head office of a CCB is located in the models. The results are not materially different from those for the models which 
do not control for regional economic growth. They are available on request.   
11 The results of OLS estimation also show a similar level of economic significance. 
12 Although the Chinese government has gradually liberalised interest rates over last two decades, the banks’ interest 
rates are still semi-controlled by the Central Bank. Feyzioglu (2009) argues that the large interest margin given by the 
managed interest-rate system is one of main reasons for the high profitability of Chinese banks. 
13 The market share of foreign banks accounts for only around 2% over the sample period, indicating that the extent of 
foreign bank penetration is relatively limited. 
